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I. Introduction 
When reviewing the academie literature on the relatjonship owner versus manager and its impact on 
the formulation of corporate goals, it appears that there are two distinct approaches. The first 
approach places the owner/investor in the middle ofJhe_ center; the sole task of the manager then is 
to maximize the owners' expected utility. In the second approach the owner/investor is only one 
participant of a group of participants, who are all trying to maximize their wealth by investing money, 
time or other resources in the firm. The first approach is usually labelled as the Anglo-Saxon concept 
while the second approach is usually labelled as the European concept. 
The primary focus on the investor resulted in a relatively more profit-driven way of management 
within US companies, when compared with European companies. Over the last decade, however, it 
can be observed that both in the US and Europe, the emphasize on profits is becoming less 
important in favor of the market value orientation. From the point of view of financial theory this may 
be regarded as a step forward, since market value is more closely related to cash flows and the 
risk/return trade-off than the profit-approach1. Based on the position of investors in the company, 
this market value approach resulted in a equity valuation orientation in the US and a company 
valuation orientation in Europe, although it can be observed that many internationaly operating 
companies in Europe have shifted their focus towards the equity valuation orientation the last few 
years. This process from profit to market value is witnessed by the growing number of companies 
that include cash flow statements and shareholder value analysis in their financial annual report. 
A direct result from the turn to a market value orientation was the increased importance of future 
cash flow analysis and the risk beared by these cash flows. Especially the relationship between 
market value and risk was a major concern that received a lot of attention in the academie literature, 
since knowledge about the identity and importance of risk^jfactors would enable managers to 
increase the market value of the firm. One of the risk factors which gained a lot of attention in the 
academie literature was estimation risk. This risk factor bears on the differential information literature, 
which focuses on the differences in availability and reliability in information between companies. 
Since investors base their investment decisions on information, the pure existence of a lack in the 
availability and reliability of information leads to more risk concerning the future return distribution. 
However, the uncertainty with regard to the parameters of the future return distribution differs among 
companies as the availability and reliability of information is company specific. Therefore, differential 
information leads to differential estimation risk. As this risk applies to every company it can not be 
simply diversifiëd away by portfolio construction. To summarize, low availability and reliability of 
information leads to a higher estimation risk and, since estimation risk is a priced risk factor, to a 
. higher expected return, resulting in a market value of equity which is beiow its optimum. 
In light of the increased attention for market value, estimation risk should be managed by the 
management of the company. Despite the potential benefits of a well formuiated investor relations 
program for the company's market value, the management of company is confined in the realization 
of it. The reason for this is that estimation risk is to some extent exoaeneous. For exampie, when a 
company belongs to the small caps it will usually gain less attention of institutions, the financial press 
and foreign investors, resulting in a relatively low information production. However, it should also be 
noticed that to some extent estimation risk is endogeneous. For exampie, the accessability of the 
annual report, contacts with the financial press and financial analysts and timely/regular information 
releases are all under the control of the management. The awareness that estimation risk is both 
priced and partly endogeneous, added to a greater emphasize on market value, resulted in a 
r ;growing number of companies that started to formulate and estabilish an investor relations policy. 
!.' Although the advantages of an IR-policy are straightforward on a theoretical basis, it is hard to 
Ï: measure its effects in practice. This measurement problem imposes a great deal of risk on the 
company's management, since the formulation and establishment of an IR-policy should always be 
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preceeded by a trade-off in terms of costs and potential benefits. In this paper we will try to explore 
the potential benefits of an IR-policy by examining the effects of differential information on .the cost of 
equity, and therefore implicitly on the cost of capital. From that analysis we may deduct an indication 
of the potential effects of a structured information policy directed at (potential) investors of the 
company. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section II we will briefly discuss the differential information 
concept. Here, we discuss the results of the anomaly studies. However, it should be mentioned that 
our focus is rather different from that in the anomaly studies. Our main concern is the relationship 
between a stock's expected return and instrumental IR-policy variables. In section III the data and re-
search methodology are discussed, foliowed by the major results in section IV. The practical 
implications of the results for investors and companies will be dealt with in section V, after which we 
will end the paper with the major conclusions in section VI. 
II Review of the literature 
: ; ] Klein and Bawa (1977) were among the first who showed that on a theoretical level differential 
I -
» 11 information limits the portfolio diversification of an investor thereby boosting the market price of risk. 
Barry and Brown (1985) extended the Klein and Bawa result in a CAPM - context, and showed that 
differential information may affect the equilibrium price of any asset. 
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Empirical support for this theoretical concept came from the anomaly studies which appeared with a 
high frequency in the academie journals during the eighties. In these anomaly studies a lot of 
empirical regularities in stock markets were uncovered that contradict the joint hypothesis of an 
efficiënt market and the validity of a specific equilibrium asset pricing model (e.g. the CAPM and 
AFT). 
Among these empirical regularities are the January anomaly (Rozeff & Kinney, 1976), the Price-Ear-
nings anomaly (Basu' 1977), the Size anomaly (Banz, 1981) and the Neglected, Firm anomaly (Arbel 
& Strebel, 1982). 
Rozeff & Kinney found that on average returns in January significantly higher than the monthly 
average in the rest of the year. Basu examined the return behavior for several P/E portfolios and 
reached the conclusion that on average low P/E stocks outperform high P/E stocks. In the same 
line of reasoning^anz did examine whether a size factor would have additonal explainatory power 
next to the CAPM-beta in a cross sectional analysis of stock returns. It appeared that a size factor 
did add explainatory power whereby the size premium was negatively related to the market 
capitalization of a stock. Finally, Arbel and Strebel found that returns on neglected stocks - neglect 
measured as the coëfficiënt of variation in analysts' mean eamings forecast and the institutional 
holding in a specific stock - are on average higher than on 'brand name' stocks. More recent neglect 
studies in which other neglect proxies were used did reach similar results (e.g. Barry & Brown 1984, 
Jacobs & Levy 1988). 
One explanation for the above mentioned anomalies is differential information. When we try to find a 
unifying factor among the different anomalies, we may observe the following: small cap stocks on 
average have a below-average price/earnings ratio; small caps with relative low p/e's are on average 
more neglected, and neglected, small cap companies that have relatively low p/e's are on average 
responsible for the abóve-average January returns. From this we may deduct the following answer to 
the question 'what do these anomaly-stocks have in common?': they all suffer from a below-average 
information production and a below-average attention of institutions, private investors and financial 
analysts. Since most anomaly studies started from an CAPM - context, which assumes perfect 
information structures, it may be the case that the observed return anomalies represent just an 
additional risk premium for bearing above-average estimation risk. 
A major problem in testing the presence of priced estimation risk in stock returns is the construction 
of information variables. Since information is a multidimensional factor it can not be readily observed. 
Therefore we have to make use of information proxies. Some proxies that have been suggested in 
empirical tests include the period of Jisting (Barry & Brown, 1984), the degree to which analyst 
opinion varies across analysts for a given security (Barry & Brown, 1985 and Barry & Gültekin, 1992) 
and the number of analysts providing research on a security (Arbel & Strebel, 1982). 
In the next section we will describe the methodology and data we have used in our tests. Our data, 
and especially our proxies, can b,e distinguished from other test since our focus is on estimation risk 
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factors that are endogeneous for the management, while at the same time we control for exogene-
ous estimation risk factors that are heavily correlated with our endogeneous estimation risk factors. 
III. Data and Research Methodoloqy 
We have made use of the IFS Database of the company IFS JFjnancial Software & Consultancy B.V. 
which contains all relevant financial data, starting from 1957, of almost all companies quoted on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE) on a monthly basis2. The dataset we used in this paper covers 
the periode 1968 - 1993 and consists of monthly total return observations of all companies listed on 
the Official Market of the ASE. This resulted in 44,452 valid observations. Also we selected eleven 
information proxies based on the empirical literature on stock market anomalies. These proxies can 
be divided in two groups: (exogeneous) control variables and (endogeneous) IR variables. Our focus 
is in the first place on the latter group of variables. The (exogeneous) control variables have been 
added to the analysis to get more efficiënt estimates with the regressions (as the control variables 
may be correlated with the IR variables) and to obtain a better understanding of the potential benefits 
of an IR policy. The variables used in the study are: 
Control variables 
a. period of listing (POL); 
b. market capitalization (SIZE); ? ' ; ••* ",. . 
c. relative market capitalization (SIZEREL); 
d. E/P ratio (E/P); 
e. E/P differential (EPDIF); 
f. stock turnover (TURN); 
g. relative stock turnover (TURNREL); 
h. dividend yield (YIELD) 
IR variables 
i. beta/volatility ratio (BETAVOL); 
j . window dressing factor (SEAL); 
k. relative price volatility around the earnings announcement (VOLRAT); 
The period of listing equais the Iength of time in years for which a security has been listed on the 
DSE and measures therefore the availability of historical price and return information. Size, Size 
Relative, E/P, E/P differential, Turnover, Relative Turnover and yield have been chosen for their 
relationship with endogeneous estimation risk (see e.g. Arbel, 1985) and play the role of controle 
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variable. Size Relative is calculated as the ratio size stock i/average size of the stocks quoted on the 
ASE. In this study E/P relative is defined the difference between a stock's E/P ratio and the E/P 
ratio of the sector. The E/P relative has been added to the list of explanatory variables, because 
earlier research made clear that E/P ratio's are highly sector dependent. If we want to use E/P as an 
information proxy, we must control for this sector infiuence3. The same applies to the dividend yield 
variable. Many studies have revealed a positive relationship between a stock's dividend yield and its 
total return (e.g. Litzenberger & Ramaswamy, 1977; Keim, 1985). Since we do not have any 
indication or prior knowledge concerning the correlation between yield and neglect we use the yield 
variable to account for potential links. . 
Stock turnover is motivated by the fact that information processing is usually induced by buy and 
sell transactions. In this line of reasoning low stock turnover signals a low rate of information proces-
sing resulting in a relative high estimation risk. Along the same line as the Size Relative, the Turnover 
Relative can be calculated as the ratio Turnover stock i/average turnover of the companies quoted 
on the ASE. - n'-.ï' - " " , - . 
The beta/volatility ratio measures to what extent a stock is part of a well diversified portfolio. For 
stock i it is defined as: 
BETAVOL, = P i ' °m ( 3 . 1 ) 
with am representing the volatility of the market portfolio. A high ratio means that the stock is traded 
by investors who relatively give much weight to bèta as a risk factor, which only applies to portfolio 
investors. Usually this group is heavily represented by Institutional investors who only seek stocks of 
information-rich companies. Therefore, a low beta/volatility ratio indicates a firm with a relative high 
estimation risk. 
The window dressing factor is defined as the difference between the average CAPM-residual in 
December and the average CAPM-residual in January, both measured over a five year period. We 
use CAPM-residuals instead of returns in order to control for differences in general market move-
ments in December and January. The assumption behind this information proxy is that portfolio 
managers clean their portfolios at the end of the year leading to buy pressure for the blue chips and 
sell pressure for the small, neglected firms, which pattern is reversed in January. Therefore, stocks 
with relatively low returns in December and high returns in January can be considered neglect and 
therefore suffer from an above-average estimation risk. 
The relative price volatility around the earnings announcement is defined as 
5 
VOLRAT = - ^ ^ , ( 3 . 2 ) 
°t 
with ajv and at being the stock's vólatility in the period of the annual report release respectively over 
the total period; both volatilities on a monthly basis and calculated over a five year period. This 
variable focuses on the information value of the annual report. For companies with a good 
information policy (and a relatively low estimation risk) the annual report holds little surprises, 
whereas the annual report of a neglected firm may be full of it. A relatively high surprise level usualiy 
leads to a more than average price vólatility around the announcement of the annual report. 
The empirical tests to the practical relevance of investor relations for companies will be employed 
along two Unes. First, we will perform some portfolio tests with the above mentioned information 
proxies as dimensions. Since portfolios are formed up to two dimensions and information proxies are 
correlated it is not possible from these portfolio tests to determine the importance of each informati-
on proxy. Therefore we also employed some multivariate regression tests in order to get an 
indication of the importance of each information proxy in explaining the cross sectional differences in 
returns and excess returns on individual stocks, thereby controlling for all other information proxies. 
The multivariate regression tests have been carried out in two ways: a) in a CAPM-framework, and 
b) within a non-equilibrium multifactor setting. In ex post form the CAPM can be described as 
follows: 
R, = Rf + QiiRn-Rf) + e , ( 3 . 3 ) 
with: 
R| = return on stock i 
Rf = return on a risk free asset 
Rm = return on the market portfolio 
/S| = beta- factor of s tock i, Cov(Rj ,Rm ) /Var(Ri) 
e, = residual return w i th E(ej) = 0 and Var(ej) = x 
Since in a CAPM-framework a stock's return is only related to its bèta, priced estimation risk factors 
may show up in the residual returns. Therefore, in the multivariate regression tests we focused on 
the CAPM-residuals by regressing them on the above mentioned information proxies. If estimation 
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risk is priced and our information variables are good proxies, we should find some significant 
relationships. Hbwever, there are at least two reasons which support the use of a non-equilibrium 
multifactor model (in which bèta is just one of many variables) over the CAPM. Firstly, many studies 
which have been carried out lately do seriously doubt the validity of the CAPM in explaining cross-
sectional differences in returns (e.g. Fama & French, 1992). Starting with the CAPM-residuals 
implicitly assumes that the CAPM is correct. Secondly, under differential information observed beta's 
may be biased due to differential estimation risk (Barry & Brown, 1985). 
Both in the CAPM framework and the non-equilibrium multifactor setting we substituted a 60-months 
adjusted bèta for the historical 60-months OLS bèta. The adjusted bèta is the weighted average of 
the 60-months historical bèta of the stock and the 60-months industry bèta4. The weights are the 
respective variances of the two bèta estimates. They are used in such a way that a larger variance of 
the one implies a larger weight for the other bèta, that is: 
'adj °
2<e,»> , » . * . , „ " V " - ' ^ . ( 3 . 4 : 
CFMPj.j,)* 0 2 (P„ ) " ° 2 <Pi . 4 >+ 0 2 (P „ ) 
with: 
2 (&
 h) = variance of the 60-month historical bèta of stock i 3W 
/S|
 h , j8s = 60-month historical bèta of stock i and industry s 
ff2 (/Ss) = variance of the 60-month historical bèta of industry s 
The motivation for this adjustment is that previous research showed that the cyclical patterns in bèta 
witnessed in the Netherlands, resulted in an explanatory power of the Standard OLS-beta close to 
zero5. This 'mean reversion' phenomenon shows a certain resemblance with the well-known 
seven/eight years business cycle, although the bèta cycles seem to be somewhat shorter on 
average. 
As a result of the two test frameworks described above, we have two regression models which need 
to be estimated: 
« i . t - Yo + J j j - ^ - . t + Si.t ( 3 - 5 A ) 
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with: 
To.Tj.«o>aj 
'U.t 
Ri,t 
*i,t 
Ri,t -.«o t « r P i , t + 2 a- . Idijit + ^ 
j=2 
CAPM residual of stock i in period t 
regression coefficients 
information proxy j of stock i in period t 
residual term with E(-) = 0 and Var(-) = x 
return of stock i in month t 
adjusted bèta of stock i in month t 
( 3 . 5 B ) 
IV. Results 
Before we did perform the regression tests, we constructed some portfolios to obtain a first 
impression of the relationship between our IR variables and stock returns. With these portfolio tests 
we controlled for size, since that appeared to be the most important control variable. 
Table 1 shows the monthly returns of some size-matched BETAVOL-portfolïos6. It appears that 
return differences between BVR-portfolios is more pronounced than the returns differences of the 
size categories. Stated otherwise, improving on BETAVOL within a specific size category seems to 
be more interesting than getting bigger within a specific BETAVOL category. 
Table 1: Monthly average returns for size-matched BETAVOL portfolios, 1968 -1993. 
Note: Portfolio S1/B1 contains the smallest stocks with the lowest BETAVOL value and 
portfolio S5/B5 contains the largest stocks with the biggest BETAVOL value. 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 BTOT 
S1 ,006 .002 .000 .004 .004 .003 
S2 .017 .013 .012 .010 .004 .012 
S3 .023 .013 .011 .011 .008 .012 
S4 .020 .013 .011 .015 .011 .013 
S5 .016 .011 .012 .011 .009 .011 
STOT .014 .009 .009 .011 .008 .010 
Another remarkable result that follows from table 1 is the performance of the first size quintile (the 
smallest compahies), since these companies have the lowest returns. An possible explanation for this 
is probably the fact that these stocks are held by a small number of investors, including the 
management of the company, who seldom trade their stocks. As this small group of investors is 
usually very well informed these small stocks can be very risky for the average investor. So, the low 
returns should not be interpreted as a refiection of a below-average risk profile. 
Table 2 and 3 report the monthly returns of respectively the size-matched VOLRAT and the size-
matched SEAL portfolios. From both tables we can deduct similar conclusions as from table 1. The 
returns differences between both the VOLRAT and the SEAL portfolios seem to be more obvious 
than those between the size portfolios. From inspection of the second and sixth colum of the tables 
1, 2 and 3 we may deduct the conclusion that both BETAVOL and VOLRAT are gradually more 
important on average than SEAL, although the return differences between B1/B5, V1/V5 and 
SE1 /SE5 are all worth realizing from an economie point of view. 
Table 2: The monthly average returns of the size-matched VOLRAT portfolios, 1968 -1993. 
Note: the V1/S1 portfolio contains the smallest stocks with the smallest volatility ratio, and the 
V5/S5 portfolio contains the largest stocks with the biggest volatility ratios. 
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VTOT 
S1 .001 .003 -.001 .002 .009 .003 
S2 .009 .005 .009 .013 .021 .012 
S3 .009 . .009 .013 .014 .017 " .012 
S4 .010 .015 .013 .010 .019 .013 
S5 .011 .008 .010 .012 .015 .011 
STOT .008 .008 .009 .010 .016 .010 
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Table 3: The monthly average returns of the size-matched SEAL portfolios, 1968 - 1993. 
Note: the SE1/S1 portfolio contains the smallest stocks with the smallest SEAL values, and 
portfolio SE5/S5 contains the largest stocks with the biggest SEAL values. 
SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5 BTOT 
S1 -.007 .008 .002 .002 .013 .003 
S2 .011 .011 .014 .014 .017 .012 
S3 .013 .011 ,013 .009 .019 .012 
S4 .014 .003 .011 .016 .018 .013 
S5 .011 .001 .013 .011 .013 .011 
STOT .009 .007 .011 .010 .016 .010 
From the foregoing analysis it is not possible to determine the specific importance of the IR variables 
seperately. Firstly, the three IR variables we use in our test may be correlated leading to similar 
results in the portfolio tests. Secondly, both BETAVOL, VOLRAT and SEAL may be correlated to 
some omitted variables that are exogeneous from the point of view of the management, thereby 
overstating the benefits of an IR policy. 
To deal with these problems we employed some multivariate regression tests with the information 
related variables described in section III. As mentioned in section III we can use two model 
specificationg to test the significance of the IR variables: the CAPM related framework (eq. 3.5A) and 
the non-equilibrium multifactor framework (eq. 3.5B). Table 4 reports the results of both models. 
Although the coefficients of the statistically significant variables in both regression frameworks have 
the expected sign, the non-equilibrium multifactor framework performs better than the CAPM 
framework, which is indicated by the better R2 and t-values. Both regression do not suffer from 
autocorrelation patterns in the residuals since the DW-statistic is close to two. However, inspection of 
the residual plots reveals a severe heteroskadasticity problem, leading to inefficiënt estimators in the 
regression equations. To deal with the volatility clustering in the residuals we also employed some 
WLS regressions7. Since the non-equilibrium multifactor framework did perform better than the 
CAPM framework, we only used the monthly return as regressand (see eq. 3.5B). To control for 
potential 'error in the variables' disturbances we employed the WLS regressions both on the 
individual stock level and the portfolio level, using size sorted portfolios in the latter case. 
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Table 4: The reiation between information related proxies and return/CAPM-residual, 1968- ; 
1993; t-statistics between brackets. 
* i . t - Y0 +}=11j- Ji.J.t + *i.t ( 3 - 5 A ) 
Ri. t = a o + « i • P i , t + ? a j • Ii,j, t + u i , t 
J 2 
INFORMATION PROXY CAPM-RESIDUAL RETURN 
CONSTANT -0,005 
(-3,03) 
-0,023 
(-7,32) 
SIZE 0,012 
(11,95) 
0,025 
(21,27) 
SIZEREL -0,003 
(-0,98) 
-0,025 
(-6,57) 
TURN -0,007 
(-6,98) 
-0,017 
(-14,18) 
TURNREL -0,011 
(-2,10) 
0,005 
(0,86) 
E/P 3,058 E-04 
• (0,65) 
0,001 
(3,66) 
EPDIF -4,624 E-04 
(0,96) 
-0,002 
(-3,81) 
YIELD 0,042 
(5,26) 
0,062 
(6,98) 
POL 1,044 E-04 
(0,62) 
3,90 E-05 
(2,06) 
BÈTA — 0,033 
(12,06) 
BETAVOL -0,017 
(-5,55) 
-0,035 
(12,06) 
VOLRAT 0,013 
(6,40) 
0,018 
(8,00) 
SEAL 0,050 
(6,20) 
0,041 
(5,91) 
DW-STATISTIC 2,09 1,95 
R2 0,015 0,026 
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Table 5 reports the results of the WLS regressions on individual stock level. As we can see, all three 
IR variables are significant on the 1%-level, even after controliing for many exogeneous information 
related variables. To save space we only report the variables that are statistically significant. Similar 
as in the portfolio analysis BETAVOL and VOLRAT perform slightly better than SEAL This would 
mean that eniarging the number of institutional investors and upgrading (in terms of more reguiar 
and timely) the information poiicy should be the major concern for the IR manager*. 
Table 5: Results of the WLS regression of return on several information proxies, 1968-1993; 
individual stock level 
VARIABLE COËFFICIËNT T-VALUE 
* CONSTANT -.0222 -7.366 
SIZE .0243 30.884 
SIZEREL -.0230 -14.453 
VASI .0333 12.560 
BETAVOL -.0440 -11.552 
VOLRATIO .0172 7.623 
YIELD .0611 6.645 
SEAL .0320 4.741 
EPRAT .0019 3.442 
EPRELSEC -.0020 -3.549 
POL 4.610 E-05 2.540 
TURN -.0165 -30.930 
The results of the WLS regressions on the size sorted portfolios are reported in table 6. Since 
portfolio formation implies a substantial reduction in observations it is not surprising that all t-
statistics are lower than those reported in table 5. As a results our IR variable SEAL is no longer 
significant. However, our IR variables BETAVOL and VOLRAT are still 'alive and kicking' on the 5%-
level. At first glance, taking account of the reduction in observations, it seems that table 5 and 6 do 
not differ very much, implying that there is no severe 'error in the variables' problem. 
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Table 6: Results of the WLS regressions of stock return on several information proxies; 1968-
1993; size sorted portfolios 
VARIABLES COËFFICIËNT T-VALUE 
CONSTANT -.0458 -3.351 
SIZE .0329 11.306 
SIZEREL -.0258 -6.811 
TURN -.0231 -10.443 
VASI .0774 5.388 
EPRAT .0085 3.095 
EPRATSEC -.0080 -2.493 
BETAVOL -.0906 -4.043 
VOLRATIO .0385 2.946 
To summarize, when taking account of heteroskedasticity and potential 'error.in the variables' 
disturbances, together with a potential correlation between the IR variables and some exogeneous 
information related variables, it appears that our IR variables could explain a statistical significant 
portion of the cross sectional differences in stock returns, though the SEAL variable dropped from 
the list in the WLS regressions on size sorted portfolios. 
V. Practical Implications 
It follows from section IV that our IR variables BETAVOL, VOLRAT and SEAL can be considered 
priced risk factors which explain a statstical significant portion of cross sectional differences in 
returns. However, that information is not sufficiënt to support some kind of IR policy. As we 
mentioned in the beginning of this paper every decision concerning the formulation and establish-
ment of an IR policy should be preceeded by an cost-benefit trade-off. \hjs implies that we have to 
express the potential benefits in terms of returns or cash. For that purpose we will use the portfolio 
analysis we started with in section IV. Holding the size category constant, we will calculate the 
potential reduction in expected returns from a shift from B1/V5/SE5 towards B5/V1/SE1. Before we 
can calculate the total effect we have to make certain assumptions concerning the correlation 
between the three IR variables. When we assume that the three variables are uncorrelated, we can 
calculate the total benefit by summing the three separate effects. However, such an approach would 
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give in overstatement of the total effect in case the IR variables are correlated. Over the period 
1968 - 1993 we find that the correlation between the IR variables is on average 0.02. Though that 
would support the summation of the three separate effects, we have - based on conservatism and 
caution - calculated the total benefit as the average of the three separate effect. This yields the 
following results: 
Size category Reduction in expected monthly return 
51 0.40 
52 1.03 
53 1.16 
54 0.73 
55 0.43 
Transforming the benefits to an annual return, the reduction in expected returns due to IR ranges 
from 5% (S1) to 14% (S3). We may assume that in light of these benefits an IR policy yields a net 
benefit for almost every company. Moreover, one has to bear in mind that a well formulated IR policy 
has more instrumental variables than we have been able to adress in this study. Seen in this 
perspective our results may even understate the potential benefits of an IR policy. 
VI. Summary and concludinq remarks 
In this paper we have analysed the potential benefits of an well formulated and established IR policy. 
For that purpose we did construct three IR related proxies: the beta/volatility ratio, the volatility 
around the release of the annual report related to the volatility over the total period, and the 
sensitivity of a stock to window dressing activities of institutions. 
From the regressions it foliowed that these IR proxies could be interpreted as priced risk factors that 
explain a statistical significant portion of cross sectional differences in returns. Even after controlling 
for exogeneous information related variables this notion is unaffected. 
Finally, we tried to calculate the potential benefit of an IR policy in terms of a reduction in expected 
returns. Conservative estimates ranged from 5% to 14%, which means that it is hard to find an 
company for which IR is not worth the effort. However, still has to be done yet. It would be an 
; -interesting topic for future research to create and test a wider range of IR proxies. Another 
j-interesting area for future research would be the examination of the effectiveness of an IR policy in 
'. bullish and bearish markets. Based on psychological and sociological studies it is possible that 
;investors are more sensitive to a company's IR in a bearish market than in a bullish market. All this 
Information can guide an IR manager in the formulation and establishment of his policy. 
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Notes: 
1 . This step forward is very small however. Five hundred years ago Luco Pacioli wrote, in his 
Summa that: '(1) The most important of these is cash or any equivalent...(2)...to be a good 
bookkeeper and ready mathematican...(3)...to arrange all the transactions in such a systematic way 
that one may understand each of them at a glance. (see Vis & Dorsman, 1994). In whole his Summa 
he didn't use the word profit or something in that direction. 
2. Among these financial data are stock prices, dividends, stock splits, offerings and financial 
accounting data. 
3. Although it must be stated that, for example, low sector P/E's couid also indicate that something 
is wrong with the IR in this specific sector. But momentarily, without any indications in this direction, 
this seems uniikely. Anyhow, the fact that 'E/P absolute' is not dropped from our framework after the 
introduction of the 'E/P relative', should take account of this possibility. 
4. The beta-adjustment method chosen in this paper can beregarded as a modification of the beta-
adaption technique suggested by Vasicek (1973). 
5. Van Dijk and De Ruiter, Unpublished research paper, IFS, 1991. 
6 . It appeared that the probability distributions of all IR variables could be well approximated by a 
normal distribution. We used this approximation to construct our portfolios, by dividing the 
probability distributions of the IR variables in five equaly spaced (in density terms) parts. In our 
portfolio tests each part represents a portfolio. 
7 . Additional analysis revealed that the heteroskedasticity in the residuals was caused by the size 
factor and a monthly return pattern. 
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